A brief, systematic exposition of the positions of seven classical thinkers on the subject of the logical and/or methodological unity of human knowledge. McRae writes methodically and accurately on a difficult subject.--R. G. M.

A brief, systematic exposition of the positions of seven classical thinkers on the subject of the logical and/or methodological unity of human knowledge. McRae writes methodically and accurately on a difficult subject.--R. G. M.

The dissertation does not attempt to develop a critical policy science. It attempts to investigate the possibility of one raised by writers such as Habermas. The question arises because the policy sciences are increasingly beset by aporias. These aporias are occasioned by widening perception of the limits of societal rationalization, by worries about "destructuration," and by the increasingly ideological nature of policy science. ;The first section traces the origins of the policy sciences and their development, particularly during the late nineteenth (...) and early twentieth centuries. In this period, as today, governments, foundations, and professional societies, as well as economic, political, and social events, were instrumental in defining social- and policy-scientific problems and methodologies. From this, I extrapolate the fundamental assumptions of conventional policy science--the default theory. ;The next section criticizes basic elements of the default theory as to the nature of social science and social explanation. I argue that social sciences are sciences of various aspects of intentionality and the policy sciences are best conceived of as disciplinary technologies, in Foucault's sense. I then analyze intentionality more closely and develop a theory of social explanation that accommodates it. ;The third section criticizes the elements of the default theory as to morality and legitimacy, particularly claims that rational choice theory tells us something useful about morality. It does this only indirectly by contributing to a better theory of moral error. I next discuss the duality of moral standpoints and the difficulties this creates for solving the problem of legitimacy. The discussion shows, among other things, why utilitarianism fails. ;The concluding chapter argues that Habermas' proposal for a critical policy science based on undistorted rational agreement also fails. It is a self-estrangement theory and, however attractive it is to contemplate this ideal, it fails to project a system that is motivationally reasonable to live by. As Foucault says, critical task today is "to promote new forms of subjectivity through refusal of kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.". (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession. I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth (...) of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (shrink)

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to (...) our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work. (shrink)

This treatise on aesthetics criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers new theories and interpretations, and draws important inferences concerning ...

This early work by Robin G. Collingwood was originally published in 1939 and we are now republishing it with a brand new introductory biography. 'An Autobiography' is the story of Collingwood's personal and academic life. Robin George Collingwood was born on 22nd February 1889, in Cartmel, England. He was the son of author, artist, and academic, W. G. Collingwood. He was greatly influenced by the Italian Idealists Croce, Gentile, and Guido de Ruggiero. Another important influence was his father, a professor (...) of fine art and a student of Ruskin. He published many works of philosophy, such as Speculum Mentis (1924), An Essay on Philosophic Method (1933), and An Essay on Metaphysics (1940). (shrink)

In this article we show that it is possible to completely classify the degrees of r.e. bases of r.e. vector spaces in terms of weak truth table degrees. The ideas extend to classify the degrees of complements and splittings. Several ramifications of the classification are discussed, together with an analysis of the structure of the degrees of pairs of r.e. summands of r.e. spaces.

The following three papers (by R.G.A. Dolby, R.N.D. Martin, and A. Thomson) were presented to the Science & Religion Forum at its annual meeting in Liverpool, Britain, in March 1988, under the general theme of Tradition & Authority in Science and Religion. An abbreviated version of the fourth paper given at that meeting re-entitled STS Perspective: Value Systems, by W.F. Williams, is printed on pp. 219-221 of this volume (Vol. 9, No. 4). A copy of the full version is available (...) from either the author or the editorial office. (shrink)

EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE (...) ARBITRARY JUDGMENTS ABOUT IT. IT SHOWS ONLY THAT SOMETIMES WE CANNOT KNOW WHO IS WHO. (shrink)

The New Leviathan, originally published in 1942, a few months before the author's death, is the book which R. G. Collingwood chose to write in preference to ...

ARGUMENTS FROM DESIGN TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MAY TAKE AS THEIR PREMISS EITHER THE EXISTENCE OF REGULARITIES OF COPRESENCE OR THE EXISTENCE OF REGULARITIES OF SUCCESSION. THERE ARE NO VALID FORMAL OBJECTIONS TO A CAREFULLY ARTICULATED ARGUMENT OF THE LATTER TYPE. AGAINST SUCH AN ARGUMENT NONE OF THE OBJECTIONS IN HUME’S "DIALOGUES" HAVE ANY WORTH. THE ARGUMENT MAY HOWEVER GIVE ONLY A SMALL DEGREE OF SUPPORT TO ITS CONCLUSION.